On My Radar: The Yen Carry Trade, Margin Debt, Oil and Inflation
July 24, 2026
By Steve Blumenthal
“You can avoid reality, but you cannot avoid the consequences of ignoring reality.”
- Ayn Rand
For years, the yen carry trade has quietly done its job: borrow cheap in Tokyo, invest for more everywhere else, and don't ask too many questions about what happens if it ever reverses. It reversed once already in August 2024, and briefly took the stock market down with it. I think we're closer to a second act than most investors realize.
Today's OMR walks through what the yen carry trade actually is, in plain English, how it connects to margin debt and the price of oil, and the specific signals I'm watching for the moment it turns. I'll also cover the new round of tariffs that quietly took effect overnight, dressed up as something else entirely.
Grab your coffee and find your favorite chair. And save a few minutes for the personal note — there's real, credible news on age reversal, and it's worth the read.
Here's what's on my radar this week.
On My Radar:
Personal Note: David Friedberg On Age Reversal
OMR is for informational and educational purposes only. No consideration is given to your specific investment needs, objectives, or tolerances.
Please see the Important Disclosures at the bottom of this page. Reminder: This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. My views may change at any time. The information is for discussion and educational purposes only.
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The Yen Carry Trade, Margin Debt, Oil and Inflation
Monday, August 5, 2024. Tokyo’s Nikkei 225 fell 12.4% in a single session, its worst day since Black Monday in 1987. The S&P 500 dropped 3% by the close. The VIX spiked above 65. Traders spent the morning trying to figure out what had happened. Source: CNBC
The answer, it turned out, was the yen.
The Bank of Japan had raised interest rates a quarter point, a small move by any normal standard. But it was enough to spook a trade that had quietly grown into one of the largest sources of leverage in the global financial system: the yen carry trade. Within days, hedge funds and institutions worldwide were forced to unwind billions of dollars of borrowed yen, and every asset that money had funded, US tech stocks included, got sold to help pay for it.
I bring this up because we are, in some ways, watching the sequel. Different actors, same script, and this week the yen is back at the center of my radar.
What Is the Yen Carry Trade? (In Plain English)
Here is the simplest way I can explain it.
Japan has kept interest rates near zero for the better part of three decades. If you’re a hedge fund, a bank, or frankly anyone with access to capital markets, you can borrow yen for next to nothing, convert those yen into dollars, and invest the proceeds in higher-yielding US assets: Treasury bonds, corporate credit, even stocks. You pocket the difference between what you pay to borrow and what you earn on the investment. Wall Street calls that difference the “carry.” In a low-volatility world, it is close to free money.
The trade works beautifully as long as two things hold: the interest rate gap between Japan and the US stays wide, and the yen doesn’t strengthen unexpectedly. If it does, the dollars you eventually convert back into yen buy you fewer yen than you borrowed, and the trade loses money fast.
Nobody knows exactly how large the yen carry trade is, because so much of it happens off balance sheet, through derivatives and repo markets. Estimates run into the trillions of dollars. What we do know is that when it unwinds, it unwinds fast, because everyone is trying to close the same trade through the same narrow door at the same time. That is what happened in August 2024. It is also exactly what Felix Zulauf flagged as the thing to watch this cycle, in a conversation with Jeffrey Gundlach that I summarized a few weeks ago (see: On My Radar: Zulauf – Gundlach, June 26, 2026). Zulauf’s point was that Japan’s debt problem itself is manageable, since most of it is owned domestically. The bigger risk is whether Japanese investors decide to bring their money home. “That could have major consequences globally,” he said.
Where We Stand Today
The yen closed this week near ¥163.8 to the dollar, its weakest level since December 1986. Before this year, you would have to go back nearly 40 years to find the yen this cheap against the dollar.
A few forces are pulling in opposite directions:
The Bank of Japan hiked its policy rate to 1% on June 16, the highest level since 1995, and Governor Ueda has signaled at least one more quarter-point hike by September. Japan is trying to defend its currency by making it more attractive to hold.
Japan’s Ministry of Finance has already spent an estimated $72.5 billion on direct currency intervention this year, buying yen and selling dollars. As of early July, Finance Minister Katayama has refused to name a specific defense level, saying only that Tokyo will act “at any moment,” even on US holidays. The silence, by design, is the strategy.
The US-Japan interest rate gap has narrowed to roughly 300 basis points, down from over 500 at the 2024 peak, but it remains wide enough to keep the carry trade attractive. Kevin Warsh’s hawkish debut as Fed Chair (see: On My Radar: Bravo Kevin Warsh, June 19, 2026) has, if anything, kept US rates higher for longer, which keeps the pressure on the yen.
That last point is worth being with. A tougher Fed is good news for the inflation fight at home. It is not obviously good news for Japan, or for anyone leaning on the yen carry trade to fund a position somewhere else in the world. A higher
I’d also point you back to something I flagged in May (see: On My Radar: U.S. vs. China – Energy, Control, and the Global Order, May 15, 2026): Japan’s 10-year government bond yield had hit a 29-year high alongside a broader global bond bear market, with UK gilts at an 18-year high, German bunds at a 15-year high, and the US 10-year pressing 4.50%. That yield has kept climbing and is at 4.66% at the time of this post. The JGB 10-year touched levels not seen since 1996 in early July, and the 20-year JGB hit a multi-decade high above 3.9%. This is not a US-only story. It is a developed-world government debt story, and Japan, the world’s most indebted major economy, sits at the center of it. Sources: Trading Economics, Yahoo Finance, Investing.com
The 10-Year Treasury Yield - Long-term Trend Chart
Source: StockCharts.com, CMG Investment Research annotations
A Look at the 30-Year Treasury Yield
Source: Bloomberg
Bessent, Warsh, and Dalio Are All Watching the Same Thing
A few comments from important voices.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has an almost poetic relationship with the yen. Years ago, working for George Soros, he reportedly made over $1 billion shorting it. Today, as Treasury Secretary, he is on the other side of the trade entirely, spending time in Tokyo meeting with Japan’s prime minister, central bank governor, and finance minister, working to slow the currency’s slide. In June, following a call with Finance Minister Katayama, the two sides said they were “increasingly aligned” on currency policy and prepared to take “bold” steps if needed. It is a good reminder that the same person can see a market from both sides of the table, and that today’s defender was yesterday’s attacker.
Kevin Warsh, meanwhile, is fighting a related battle. His hawkish tone at his debut Fed meeting is exactly the kind of move that, historically, has triggered Japanese intervention, because a more hawkish Fed widens the very rate gap that makes the yen carry trade so attractive in the first place. Forbes columnist William Pesek summed it up in a headline I can’t improve on: “Kevin Warsh’s 2026 Starts Looking Very Japanese.” Warsh is fighting US inflation and, indirectly, making Japan’s currency problem harder to solve.
And Ray Dalio, who has spent years studying what he calls the long-term debt cycle, treats Japan as close to a textbook case. Since 2013, he has noted, holders of Japanese government bonds have lost roughly 60% of their value versus gold. Not because Japan defaulted; it never had to. The debt was simply devalued gradually, through a weaker currency and financial repression, rather than suddenly, through default. Dalio’s broader warning, that in a more fractured geopolitical world countries increasingly prefer hard assets like gold to holding one another’s currency or debt, is exactly the dynamic playing out in Japan right now. And, while a few years behind, the U.S. appears to be on the same path.
Oil Makes It Worse
Here is the piece that ties currencies directly to your wallet. Japan imports nearly all of its oil, and that oil is priced in dollars.
When the yen weakens, Japan needs more yen to buy the same barrel of oil. It is a double hit. Global oil prices are rising in dollar terms because of the still-unsettled situation around the Strait of Hormuz (Brent traded above $100 a barrel this week for the first time in two months, up more than 13% on the week). On top of that, every barrel costs more in yen simply because the yen itself is worth less. That combination, a weak currency stacked on top of rising dollar-denominated energy prices, is one of the more underappreciated channels through which currency weakness becomes imported inflation. It is happening in Japan today. It is a smaller version of the same math that applies to any oil-importing country whose currency is falling against the dollar, and it is worth remembering the next time someone tells you oil prices don’t matter to inflation because “we produce our own.”
The ‘Not Tariffs’ Tariffs
“I understand the desire to reshore key activities like producing rare earths, pharma ingredients, etc… and the goal of making more things in the US but I just don’t get this obsession with blanket tariffs, especially as US importers and consumers are eating most of it, inflation both for consumers and business is already a major economic pain point and it’s on many things we will never make here. I’ll stop there.”
— Peter Boockvar, Boock Report July 24, 2026
Seems to me to be an accurate description. What happened? Yesterday, the Trump administration announced a new round of tariffs covering 60 trading partners and approximately 99.4% of all U.S. imports. They take effect today, July 24.
Here is what changed:
A 10% tariff will apply to imports from countries that have adopted, or committed to adopt, prohibitions against goods produced with forced labor.
A 12.5% tariff will apply to countries that have not made those commitments.
The 10% group includes Canada, Mexico, the United Kingdom, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Argentina, Pakistan and several others.
China and many other trading partners fall into the 12.5% group.
Oil, natural gas, fertilizer, certain food products, raw materials, medicines and goods already subject to Section 232 tariffs are among the exemptions.
Why the unusual justification?
The Supreme Court struck down Trump’s earlier “Liberation Day” tariffs imposed under emergency-powers law. The administration temporarily replaced them with a 10% global import surcharge under Section 122, but that authority expired today.
The administration has now rebuilt essentially the same tariff wall under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Instead of saying the tariffs are needed to correct trade deficits, the stated purpose is to punish countries that fail to prohibit imports made with forced labor.
That is the “not tariffs, tariffs” part:
They are presented as a human-rights enforcement action, but economically they operate as broad-based tariffs designed to preserve the administration’s tariff revenue and trade leverage.
The important takeaway is that this is largely a replacement, not an entirely new 10%–12.5% cost layered on top of yesterday’s 10% global tariff. For many imports, the baseline moves from 10% to either 10% or 12.5%. The immediate incremental increase may therefore be modest, although the legal mechanism, country classifications, and product exemptions have changed.
Higher-for-longer inflation pressures remain. Add this into the global macro mixing pot.
What This Has to Do With Margin Debt
You may be wondering what any of this has to do with US margin debt, a topic several of you have asked me about. Here is the connection.
The yen carry trade is, in effect, a hidden source of global liquidity. Cheap borrowed yen doesn’t just fund Japanese investment abroad; it helps grease the wheels for leverage everywhere, including here at home. US margin debt just hit a record $1.42 trillion, up $495 billion, or 54%, over the past twelve months (see: On My Radar: Bravo Kevin Warsh, June 19, 2026). Measured against M2 money supply, a cleaner read on how leveraged the system really is, margin debt is back near the peaks that preceded the 2000 and 2007 market tops. As Lance Roberts put it in a chart I shared a few weeks back, “Borrowed money cuts both ways. It is an accelerant, not a cushion.”
Source: @GlobalMktObserv, Deutsche Bank, FINRA
That is the connective tissue running through everything I have written about this year: an overvalued, overconcentrated, overleveraged S&P 500 (see: On My Radar: Cycles, Concentration, and Consequences, May 22, 2026), a 10-year Treasury yield I have called the match that lights the fuse (see: On My Radar: The Match, the Fuse, and 4.50%, July 17, 2026), and now a yen carry trade that has quietly become one of the largest, least visible forms of leverage in the system. These are not separate stories. They are the same story, told from three different rooms in the same house.
When leverage unwinds, whether it is margin debt, private credit, or a carry trade, it rarely announces itself in advance. August 2024 didn’t send a save-the-date card. It just happened, all at once, on a Monday morning.
Source: @GlobalMktObserv, Deutsche Bank, FINRA
Potential Signals: What to Watch
Measuring the yen carry trade directly is nearly impossible. So much of it lives off balance sheet, in derivatives, repo, and interbank lending, that no single number captures its true size. What we can do instead is watch the markets that carry trade liquidity tends to touch first, and look for cracks.
Ned Davis Research tracks exactly this in a chart worth studying closely (see below). It layers together market-derived signals that have historically moved together whenever the carry trade has come under stress:
High-yield credit spreads (Barclays U.S. High Yield Corporate OAS). This measures the extra yield investors demand to hold risky corporate debt over Treasurys. A tight, low spread means investors are comfortable taking on risk; a widening spread means the opposite: capital is pulling back and lenders want to be paid more for the risk they're taking. As of July 23, the spread sat at 2.76%, near the low end of its 20-year range. For context, it spiked above 18% in the 2008 financial crisis and above 10% in 2020. A sustained move higher is usually one of the first tells that global liquidity is draining.
Emerging market credit default swaps (Dow Jones CDX Emerging Markets Diversified Index). This measures the cost of insuring against default on emerging market sovereign and corporate debt. Carry trade capital has long found a home in higher-yielding, riskier EM bonds, so this index is sensitive to the same liquidity swings. It closed at 148.56 on July 23, well below the roughly 1,000 level it hit in 2008 and the 400-plus readings during the 2011 European debt scare, the 2015-16 China and commodity slide, and the 2020 COVID shock. A sharp rise here, especially alongside #1, is a warning sign.
The yen exchange rate itself. This is the most direct signal. When the carry trade is alive and well, the yen tends to stay weak, or get weaker, as capital keeps flowing out of Japan chasing higher yields elsewhere. When the trade unwinds, the yen snaps back fast, exactly as it did in August 2024, when it appreciated roughly 6% against the dollar in about a week. NDR's chart also tracks the yen against the Australian dollar (JPY/AUD), another classic carry-funding pair, since Australia's higher-yielding bonds have long been a popular destination for cheap yen. Both pairs are sitting near multi-decade lows right now, which tells you the carry trade is still very much intact. A sharp, sustained yen rally against either currency would be the signal that it's coming undone.
Source: NDR
What Today's Readings Are Telling Us
Here is the uncomfortable part. As of this week, all three signals sit near the calm end of their historical range: credit spreads are tight, emerging market CDX is low, and the yen is cheap against both the dollar and the Australian dollar. In other words, the market is priced for the carry trade to keep working smoothly.
That is not necessarily bearish news on its own. But it's worth remembering that every prior unwind, 2008, 2011, 2015-16, 2020, and August 2024, showed up first as calm, then as a rapid, simultaneous move across these signals within days, not months. Zulauf's warning about Japanese investors repatriating capital, and the Bessent-Warsh balancing act between fighting US inflation and keeping the yen from cracking further, are exactly the kinds of pressures that could flip this chart quickly.
My takeaway: don't watch the yen in isolation. Watch it alongside high-yield spreads and emerging market CDX. When all three start moving together, and especially when the yen starts strengthening quickly, that's the tell that the carry trade many investors are quietly relying on for liquidity is starting to come apart.
Bottom Line
I am not predicting a repeat of August 2024 on any particular date. I don’t know if the yen is the trigger this time, or the 10-year Treasury, or something else entirely. What I do know is that the yen, Japan’s bond market, and the leverage building in US markets are all connected, and all worth watching together rather than in isolation. Keep an eye on ¥163–165 and on any sign that the Bank of Japan is finally getting serious about defending its currency. When Japanese money starts coming home in size, it tends to matter for markets everywhere.
Opinions are subject to change. Not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Please note that the information provided is not recommended for buying or selling any security and is provided for discussion purposes only.
Key Charts to Watch
“The last Japanese yen defense bought them days, not a bottom. USD/JPY just tagged 163.99, one print from the 164 line that previously forced Tokyo’s hand. They already burned a record ¥11.7T ($73B) earlier this year. The pair got smashed, then marched straight back to fresh 40-year highs within days. $1.09T in reserves still sits on the books. Looks comfortable until you realize the next round has to be materially larger just to leave a mark that lasts longer than a long weekend. Carry desks max-long USDJPY into the most obvious intervention zone in years are the ones exposed. They have been paid handsomely to fade every verbal warning. Actual MoF orders will reprice that assumption in one violent session. History does not repeat, but the fade after the last intervention is the only template that matters right now.”
Source: @MacroAlphaHQ
You’ll find several more excellent charts on leverage in last week’s OMR. Here is the direct link to the chart section.
High Yield Junk Bonds
I like to call the high-yield bond market the Canary in the Coal Mine. It is an early warning signal for risk assets.
The first of the two HY charts that follow looks at the price of a large and popular high-yield bond fund. The bottom section plots the Monthly MACD. It is a moving-average signal that compares a shorter-term moving-average price line with a longer-term moving-average price line. Signals occur when the lines cross, indicating a trend direction.
Red arrows are downtrend signals; green are uptrend signals.
Red alert! The monthly MACD does not signal frequently - it is now in a downtrend signal.
Source: Stockcharts.com, CMG Investment Research
This next chart looks at the daily price activity of the same high-yield bond mutual fund. The lower section plots the daily MACD trend signals.
Source: Stockcharts.com, CMG Investment Research
Here is another chart I keep my eye on. It’s been bullish for months and is now in a neutral signal. Same idea as above: measuring current price vs. a moving average. When both the price of the S&P 600 index (small cap stocks) and the number of stocks in the S&P 600 index advancing in price vs declining in price fall below a smoothed moving average price line, it is historically bearish for risk assets. The current signal is mixed.
Source: NDR
Households Are “All-In”
Not only is the S&P 500 index extremely overvalued, but investors, as measured by the Average Investor Equity Allocation Percentage, are all-in.
Note the high correlation with “Average Equity Allocation Percentage” and “Subsequent Rolling 10-Year S&P 500 Index Total Return.”
The current level suggests a -2% outcome ten years from now.
Bottom line: Find other areas that may present better return opportunities.
Source: NDR
And investor cash allocations are near other market peaks. Another sign of investors being “all-in.”
Source: @ThierryBorgeat
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Personal Note: David Friedberg On Age Reversal
One of the exciting parts of my day job is diligencing and investing in venture capital-type opportunities. I have deep connections and understanding of biopharma and bioagriculture.
In this direction, I want to share with you the following from David Friedberg’s All-In Podcast “Science Corner.”
David discusses new data on reversing aging!
Click on the image to watch the short video. Exciting stuff!
Source: All In Podcast
Dinner in Chicago, August 19, 2026
I’ll be hosting a dinner for clients and OMR readers in Chicago on Wednesday, August 19, 2026. If you are interested in joining, please email Amy@cmgwealth.com to reserve a spot (space is limited).
Vacation
There will be no On My Radar next week. Susan and I are heading to the Jersey Shore (Stone Harbor) for a long weekend. Some much-needed downtime. I’ll be reading my dear friend Tom Giachetti’s new book, The Ladder. Tom became my SEC attorney after a chance meeting at a Washington, D.C. conference in 1992. He was seated next to my father and struck up a conversation. Tom excused himself, and moments later he was presenting on stage. When he sat back down, Dad said, “Tom, we need to talk.”
I sure do love and appreciate him, and I hope you enjoy his book. I’ve hot-linked the book cover if you are interested.
I know I packed a lot into this week's letter. No need to read it all in one sitting; take it in chunks and come back to a section later if it's useful. I do the same thing with pieces I want to absorb.
Thanks for reading.
Tonight, raise a glass — let's toast to age reversal!
Kind regards,
Steve
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Stephen B. Blumenthal
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Stephen Blumenthal founded CMG Capital Management Group in 1992 and serves today as its Executive Chairman and CIO. Steve authors a free weekly e-letter entitled, “On My Radar.” Steve shares his views on macroeconomic research, valuations, portfolio construction, asset allocation and risk management. Author of Forbes Book: On My Radar, Navigating Stock Market Cycles.
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